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Abstract: Now well into its second decade, the field of Computer Supported
Collaborative Learning (CSCL) appears healthy, while encompassing a diversity of
topics of study, methodologies, and representatives of various research communities.
It is an appropriate time to ask: what central questions can integrate our work into a
coherent field? This paper proposes the study of technology affordances for
intersubjective meaning-making as an integrating research agenda for CSCL. A brief
survey of epistemologies of collaborative learning and forms of computer support for
that learning characterize the field to be integrated and motivate the proposal. A
hybrid of experimental, descriptive and design methodologies is proposed in support
of this agenda. A working definition of intersubjective meaning-making as joint
composition of interpretations of a dynamically evolving context is provided, and
used to propose a framework around which dialogue between analytic approaches
can take place.   
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Introduction
Computer Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL) has been active for at least a decade since
the 1995 conference in Bloomington, and is entering its second decade with the founding of a
journal dedicated to the field. The primary purpose of this paper is to offer a research agenda for
this second decade; an agenda that is one among many but is proposed as the most paradigmatic
for CSCL in terms of the problems that the field now needs to address and is perhaps most
uniquely ready to address. Koschmann (2002) has characterized CSCL as “a field centrally
concerned with meaning and practices of meaning-making in the context of joint activity and the
ways in which these practices are mediated through designed artifacts.”  The proposed agenda
accepts but elaborates on Koschmann’s definition. This paper is organized according to
constituents of the definition: collaborative learning as meaning-making, approaches to mediation
through designed artifacts, and methodologies for the study of these two facets of CSCL.
Although the range of current theory and practice within CSCL is discussed, the argument is
analytic rather than empirical, making a case for what should be the thematic focus of CSCL
based on identification of those problems in the nexus of computer mediation and collaborative
learning that are our special concern.
CL: Learning and Meaning-making
What is the central phenomenon of interest for CSCL? Since “computer supported” is an adjunct
to “collaborative learning,” let us begin by looking more closely at what we mean by the latter.
Epistemologies for Collaborative Learning
Any CSCL research agenda will be based on assumptions, implicit or explicit, concerning what it
means to learn in collaborative settings. This section identifies epistemologies common in CSCL
in order to understand the range of phenomena we are trying to support and to prepare for
subsequent discussion. For purposes of brief exposition, the epistemologies will be presented in
terms of their most distinguishing commitments, so are necessarily oversimplified. Broadly
speaking, there are two kinds of accounts. In individual epistemologies, the individual is the
learning agent, who may benefit from the collaborative situation. In intersubjective
epistemologies, the group is the learning agent, within which individual participation may change.
Between these extremes, one can postulate that learning is a group activity that results in
individual changes, which we also call “learning.”
Although not an epistemology of collaborative learning, constructivism (Piaget, 1976; von
Glaserfeld, 1995) is frequently cited as a motivating theory in our literature and underlies some
collaborative epistemologies, so is a useful starting point for the discussion. A constructivist
epistemology emphasizes the agency of the learner in the learning process. Learning can only
happen through the learner’s efforts at meaning-making (making sense of the world), although a
mentor might arrange for the learner to have challenging experiences in order to accelerate the
change process. Computer support motivated by this epistemology includes simulations and
“microworlds” (Rieber, 2004). All knowledge is acquired by being constructed by the learner;
therefore from the standpoint of the learner, learning necessarily means constructing new
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knowledge. CSCL researchers rarely take this view to its solipsistic extreme. Instead,
constructivism takes the form of “collaborative knowledge construction” (Stahl, 2000), implying
an interactional constructivist epistemology. This brings us to the question of how interaction
between people leads to learning.
We begin with individual epistemologies, in which the individual is the unit and agent of
learning. Since we are concerned with collaborative learning, we focus on such learning that takes
place “in the context of joint activity” (Koschmann, 2002; emphasis added). In an individual
epistemology, collaboration provides the conditions and support for learning, but is not intrinsic
to the learning itself. A social-as-context view might maintain that learning remains fundamentally
a process within individual minds, yet this process can be enhanced through contacts with other
minds. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) and socio-cognitive conflict theory (Doise
& Mugny, 1984) can be read this way.
A knowledge-communication epistemology (Wenger, 1987) is common in the CSCL literature
(e.g., Bromme, Hesse & Spada, 2005). Knowledge communication is “the ability to cause and/or
support the acquisition of one’s knowledge by someone else, via a restricted set of
communication operations” (Wenger, 1987, p. 7). Research conducted under this epistemology
examines how to more effectively present knowledge in some medium, or how to otherwise
generate or facilitate communications that “cause and/or support” the desired acquisition of
knowledge. Although work that takes a knowledge-transfer view of knowledge communication
continues to be published, the trend within the knowledge communication tradition is towards
more constructivist and more interactional views.
Many CSCL authors (e.g., Baker, Hansen, Joiner & Traum. 1999; Rummel & Spada, 2005;
van Der Pol, Admiraal & Simons, 2003) build their interactionalism on the metaphor of “common
ground” from Clark's contribution theory (Clark & Brennan, 1991). Pfister (2005) proposes that
adding knowledge to common ground “is the gist of cooperative learning: going from unshared to
shared information.” This conception of “cooperative learning” has its merits. It attributes
learning to group interaction rather than to a unidirectional transfer of information between
individuals. It relies on an influential model of communication that bridges psycholinguistic and
social perspectives, and thereby offers CSCL a substantial research literature to draw upon. Yet,
in focusing on the sharing of information (presumably that was formerly held by a subset of the
participants), it does not explain how knowledge that did not predate the communication is
jointly constructed within the communication process. See also Koschmann & LeBaron (2003)
for a critique of the concept of “common ground” as a “place with no place” that is only an
approximation to contingently changing interpretations.
A more radically interactional epistemology, which for now will be called intersubjective
learning, goes beyond an information sharing conception of collaborative learning in two ways.
First, interpretations can be jointly created through interaction in addition to being formed by
individuals before they are offered to the group. Cognitive activities underlying learning can be
distributed across individuals and information artifacts through and with which they interact
(Hollan, Hutchins & Kirsch, 2002). In the most extreme version of this epistemology, learning is
not only accomplished through the interactions of the participants, but also consists of those
interactions (Koschmann et al., 2005). (This concept of learning as activity will be discussed
later.) Second, intersubjectivity is to be understood in a participatory sense: it is a simultaneous
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process of mutual constitution that may involve disagreement as well as agreement about shared
information (Matusov, 1996) within a “polyphonic nonharmonious concert characterized by
synchronic movements, as well as by distinct, conflicting, and dissonant voices” (Smolka, De
Goes, & Pina, 1995). An intersubjective epistemology is distinguished from common ground by
assuming a participatory process within which beliefs are enacted (and in this sense are shared
from the outset) without necessarily being mutually accepted.
In addition to intersubjectivity on the interpersonal level, we find within CSCL intersubjective
epistemologies that address learning at the community level. A participatory epistemology
conceives of learning as a process of “legitimate peripheral participation” in the practices of a
community (Lave & Wenger, 1991). It is possible to read participatory accounts from an
individual epistemological perspective: one becomes a member of a community by acquiring that
community's cultural practices and world-view through apprenticeship. A related concept is that
of internalization: developmental learning through social interaction can be understood as the
internalization of interpersonal processes as intrapersonal processes (Vygotsky, 1978).
However, more radical participatory epistemologies dispense with notions of acquisition or
internalization and treat learning as participation (Rogoff, 1995). In this view, “learning is an
integral part of generative social practice in the lived-in world” (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 35)—a
process that constructs personal identity, entwining individual learning with group practices that
themselves can change. Although social systems are organized to replicate themselves, they can
“learn” when local innovations undertaken in response to internal tensions and external
disturbances redistribute activity across the system (Engeström, 2001). The new practices can be
reflected in concomitant creation of novel artifacts that support and help to replicate these
practices (Wartofsky, 1979).
Another community level epistemology is knowledge building, which should not be confused
with the linguistically similar knowledge construction. Knowledge building is a collective version
of Scardamalia and Bereiter’s (1991) intentional learning. The difference is described by the
Institute for Knowledge Innovation and Technology (http://ikit.org/kb.html, accessed August 31,
2004) as follows:
To understand knowledge building it is essential to distinguish learning—“the process
through which the cultural capital of a society is made available to successive generations”
from knowledge building—the deliberate effort to increase the cultural capital.
Scardamalia and Bereiter have worked extensively within primary school classrooms, some of
which they describe as instances of “knowledge building communities.” Whether knowledge is
“new” is relative to the cultural capital of the community undertaking the activity, such as the
knowledge available to the children in a primary school class. The essential difference between
knowledge building and other forms of learning is that members of a knowledge building
community expand the boundaries of their knowledge through their own collective agency by
periodically reflecting on the limits of their understanding and choosing actions that address these
limitations.
For simplicity, the remainder of this paper will use collaborative learning to encompass all
socially contextualized forms of learning, although it should be noted that a distinction between
cooperative learning as parallel coordinated activity and collaborative learning as an effort to
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maintain a joint conception is made in the literature (Dillenbourg, 1999; Roschelle & Teasley,
1995). The other phrases are layered in the following manner: knowledge construction recognizes
that individuals create meaning for themselves rather than just receiving it preformed from others;
collaborative knowledge construction more specifically locates this meaning-making in a group
context; intersubjective learning further specifies that the process of meaning-making is itself
constituted of social interactions; and knowledge building requires that this group-based meaning-
making is being done intentionally.
The Case for Studying Intersubjective Learning
Koschmann’s definition of CSCL as being concerned with the “practices of meaning-making in
the context of joint activity” can be understood under many of the epistemologies previously
discussed. Like the Hindu parable in which several blind men feel an elephant and each describe it
differently, all are describing some aspect of the truth: learning happens in many ways. However,
the question we face is how to most productively focus our research efforts: which aspect of the
elephant do we now most need to understand?
The first major claim of this paper is that we most need to understand those processes of
learning highlighted by intersubjective epistemologies, at both the interpersonal and
community levels.
Intersubjective learning is an appropriate topic for CSCL because it is more uniquely suited to
a field that conceives of itself as being concerned with collaborative learning than the other
epistemologies. There has been substantial work on how the cognitive processes of participants
are influenced by social interaction, and others will continue this work. The study of individual
learning that is merely stimulated by a social context does not distinguish CSCL as strongly from
other fields that study learning.
The study of intersubjective learning is interesting because it gives rise to questions that are
among the most challenging facing any social-behavioral science, and even touches upon our
nature as conscious beings. Do cognitive phenomena exist transpersonally? How is it possible for
learning, usually conceived of as a cognitive function, to be distributed across people and artifacts
(Salomon, 1993)? Can we understand knowledge as accomplished practice rather than as a
substance or even predisposition? Yet we need not leave individual learning behind. In support of
this research agenda, cognitivists can ask: What is the relationship of the change process we call
“individual learning” to that individual’s participation in socially accomplished learning?
The study of intersubjective learning is timely because the composition of the CSCL
community is becoming increasingly well equipped to address this topic. We find among those
who count themselves as members of the CSCL community people who are accomplished in
various relevant disciplines and research traditions.
Finally, a call for the study of intersubjective learning is needed because it is currently not
prominent as a topic of study in our field: it is surprisingly difficult to find research publications
within CSCL that directly address this epistemology. (Exceptions will be noted shortly.) Even
where process data is examined in detail, the analysis typically counts features that are
essentially proxies for interactive accomplishment of learning (e.g., number of utterances of a
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given type) rather than exposing collaborative knowledge construction in action. The author need
go no further than his own work to illustrate this point (e.g., Suthers & Hundhausen, 2003).
 Learning as a Scientific Concept
The foregoing sections surveyed a variety of accounts of collaborative learning, and concluded
that while all provide some insight into learning, CSCL needs to study the intersubjective
processes of learning. Following Garfinkel, Koschmann et al. (2005) argue for the study of
“member's methods” of meaning-making: “how participants … actually go about doing learning”
(emphasis in original). Yet, learning was never defined. Various theories about how learning
happens in group settings were discussed, but these are theories to be tested, not definitions. By
what definition can we recognize that participants are “doing” learning?
The agenda outlined in this paper is deliberately designed to avoid depending on a particular
definition of learning. Learning takes place within a huge diversity of activities and situations:
learning is ubiquitous. Any attempt to write a single definition that covers this diversity would
risk producing a concept too undiscriminating to be a productive basis for a research program,
while more discriminating definitions might exclude potentially productive lines of work. The
strategy taken in this paper is to integrate the field of CSCL by providing a basis for dialogue
between researchers following multiple conceptions of learning and methodological traditions—a
basis to be developed in this and later sections. Yet, some comments on what would count as a
suitable definition of “learning” and the role of that concept in analysis may help to motivate the
proposal.
If we are going to study how people go about doing learning in practice, then in order to avoid
circularity in the research agenda we need an operational definition of learning that allows learning
to be identified without presupposing that a particular kind of practice constitutes learning. The
definition of learning taken at the outset cannot be written in terms of properties of the episodes
of practice to be studied. (In contrast, an empirically derived account of learning should specify
properties of practice related to learning, but this account is a product of the research program,
not a definition that enables the program to be undertaken.) Therefore, a scientifically useful
definition of learning is forced “outside” the episode, as it were, and must take the form of a
post-hoc judgment about consequences of the episode. Various definitions of learning already in
use meet this requirement, including learning as (1) gains from pre-test to post-test scores, (2)
transfer of problem solving success to similar tasks, (3) an individual’s attribution of an
experience as having been valuable, and (4) a community’s acceptance of a new member. From
the standpoint of the criterion just expressed, any of these definitions are acceptable for a CSCL
research agenda. All of these definitions have the property that some community makes a
judgment about the consequences of an activity. No commitment to what form the post-hoc
judgment takes or who makes that judgment is necessary to continue the following argument.
As a consequence of both the ubiquity of learning in diverse activities and situations and of
the need for a definition of learning to be independent of that which the research program seeks to
uncover, “learning” is not a concept that can be productively applied to an analysis of interaction
that seeks to understand how learning is accomplished. It is a category mistake to set out to
study “how people go about doing learning” in any sense that tries to interpret the actions as
learning actions. We cannot say, “That was a learning act.” We can say, “That act is more likely
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to lead to a particular learning accomplishment,” but this is an empirically grounded description
of contingencies, not a direct identification of learning itself.
Intersubjective Meaning-making
In order to understand learning, we must examine what participants are doing when they
engage in an activity that leads to learning. In many of the situations from which learning can
result, participants may not be engaged in an intentional effort to learn, but rather are trying to
make sense of a situation (Dervin, 2003). They do so at multiple levels: solving a problem,
maintaining interpersonal relationships, and/or affirming their identity in a community (Bronkart,
1995). A common denominator is the attempt to make a situation meaningful. The second major
claim of this paper asks that our analysis of activity stay true to this common denominator of
meaning-making:
To study the accomplishment (a post-hoc judgment) of intersubjective learning we must
necessarily study the practices (the activity itself) of intersubjective meaning-making: how
people in groups make sense of situations and of each other.
As previously noted, few studies published in the CSCL literature have addressed
intersubjective meaning-making directly. Exceptions include Koschmann et al. (2003),
Koschmann et al. (2005), Roschelle (1994), and Stahl (2004). Koschmann’s work has generally
focused on participants’ methods of problematization: identifying a situation as problematic and
requiring further analysis, possibly leading to a change of conception. Further work should
identify methods for resolving the problematized issue. These will include methods for
argumentation and negotiating meaning (Baker, 2003).
This author’s own analytic stance is that meaning-making is accomplished (and evidenced) by
the composition of interpretations of a dynamically changing context. Interpretations are enacted
in human cognitive and social activity. Interpretation can be understood in terms of the
participation/reification duality (Wenger, 1998). An interpretation takes a reification as having a
given significance for ongoing participation, thus in effect forming a new reification.
Interpretation functions as much on moment-to-moment ephemeral reifications such as thoughts,
utterances, facial expressions, and gestures as on persistent inscriptions and artifacts. An act of
interpretation may take the form of predications, commentary, restatements, or expressions of
attitude (for example), expressed verbally, gesturally, or through manipulations of
representations, and may also be “re-presented” when participants invoke inscriptions in the
medium as evoking such interpretations. The perceptual environment and accumulated history of
interpretations provides a rich context that participants may selectively choose to further
interpret. “Composition” is used in analogy to the mathematical concept of composition of
functions in order to highlight that interpretations act upon the images of previous
interpretations. Intersubjective meaning-making takes place when multiple participants
contribute to a composition of inter-related interpretations. In other words, the joint composition
of interpretations is the gist of intersubjective meaning-making. This conception provides an
alternative to “going from unshared to shared information” as the gist of cooperative learning. No
commitment to mutual beliefs residing in some Platonic realm is necessary: the physical and
historical context available to participants is the field upon which intersubjectivity plays.
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Clarifications and Implications
The claim that it is now time for CSCL to focus on practices of intersubjective meaning-making is
offered as a strategic choice. Others may choose to prioritize different directions for the field. On
the other hand, the claim that it is inappropriate to use “learning” as an analytic concept in
understanding “how people go about doing learning” is offered as an absolute claim,
independently of the foregoing strategic choice. The claim that members’ methods of
intersubjective meaning-making is the appropriate analytic concept is more agnostic concerning
epistemology than it might seem. Learning can still be conceived of as individual internalization
that results from a social activity of meaning-making (including Vygotskian internalization of the
social activity of meaning-making itself). One can equally take the opposing view that “…
orienting our inquiry by focusing on how people participate in sociocultural activity and how
they change their participation demystifies the processes of learning and development” by
eliminating the need to search for “the nature of internalization as a conduit” (Rogoff, 1995). In
advocating an intersubjective stance as a strategic choice, this paper does not reject the cognitive
agenda, but rather asks that all paradigms focus on intersubjective meaning-making as a shared
object of contemplation—a “boundary object” (Star, 1990) that will give the field the basis for
coherence through dialogue between traditions.
Practices of intersubjective meaning-making are found in potentially any and every kind of
joint human activity. One might object that the proposal requires that we attempt to understand
all of human collaborative activity, and CSCL would have lost its focus. The objection is partially
sustained: CSCL is indeed potentially concerned with all of human collaborative activity (learning
as a consequence of activity is always a possibility), but there is still a focus to CSCL’s learning
science agenda. The focus is not defined by limiting consideration to certain kinds of activity
(e.g., activities in institutionally-sanctioned learning settings such as “schooling,” or more
generally situations in which there is the intention to learn or to teach). Rather, the focus is
defined by what aspect of human collaborative activity we examine and try to make sense of:
intersubjective meaning-making.
This view of the scope of CSCL elevates the potential impact of the field. CSCL need not be
conceived of as merely a subfield of a subfield (e.g., a specialization of collaborative learning
within educational psychology). If we succeed in shedding light on intersubjective meaning-
making, it can inform many fields of inquiry. Because of the potential for misunderstandings, it
should be emphasized that the author is strongly supportive of the study of learning. The call to
replace learning with meaning-making as an analytic concept in understanding learning is done out
of necessity. If we are to serve learning well, we must grapple with intersubjective meaning-
making, and in so doing will be achieving something larger as well, whether we wish to or not.
Therefore we might as well accept this larger agenda and celebrate the relevance and longevity of
our field that it portends.
CS: Computer “Support” or Mediation
Let us now add computers to the mix. In what ways can we bring technology to bear on the
problem of supporting collaborative learning as it is variously conceived, and in particular
intersubjective meaning-making? This section identifies two distinct ways in which technology is
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applied to support collaborative learning—as medium and as constraint—and then proposes a
synthesis. (See also Hansen, Dirckinck-Holmfeld, Lewis & Rugelj (1999) for a synthesis of
“compensating” and “facilitating,” and Jerman, Soller & Lesgold (2004) for “structuring” and
“regulating.”) The prior discussion is relevant because our choice of an epistemology of
collaborative learning can affect how we approach the design of computer mediation and what
questions we ask in our research. For example, under a knowledge-communication model, we
might think about the information technologies we are designing as communication channels,
focusing on the ease with which one can move information between participants. Under an
intersubjective meaning-making model, we might design information technologies as forums
within which new ideas can be jointly formed—or discovered—and evaluated. However, it is also
possible to support collaboration without making any particular commitment to a theory of
collaborative learning. We first consider an approach that minimizes its epistemological
commitment.  
Technology as Interaction Medium
Some approaches to computer support treat technology as a communication channel in a manner
that is neutral to learning. Computer support enables interaction (and perhaps collaboration);
learning is left as incidental or up to the participants to achieve.
People often resort to computer-mediated communication (CMC) as a substitute for face-to-
face (FTF) interaction in order to make interaction possible between people at different locations
(synchronous distance interaction) or at different times (asynchronous interaction). It is not
surprising that FTF interaction would then be taken as the standard against which CMC is
evaluated (Olson & Olson, 2000). Research in this tradition tries to improve the bandwidth and
multimodality of CMC technology and fine-tune its design to match the characteristics of FTF.
For example, gaze and gesture are demonstrably vital cues in FTF interaction, so some
researchers study how to arrange cameras such that the remote image of a person gives a more
accurate indication of where they are looking or pointing (e.g., Kato et al., 2001). Without
denying that face-to-face interaction has great value, it is instructive to consider why technology-
oriented research in CSCL should not be conceived of as merely seeking online replication of the
multimodality of FTF learning. Four reasons are offered.
First, CSCL does not necessarily replace FTF interaction. Computational artifacts can also
augment spoken and gestural communication between co-present collaborators (Roschelle, 1994;
Suthers & Hundhausen, 2003), and be embedded in classrooms where much of the interaction is
FTF (Lingnau, Hoppe & Mannhaupt, 2003; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1991; Toth, Suthers &
Lesgold, 2002).
Second, although further progress can be made, ultimately the goal of replicating FTF
interaction online may not be achievable. “Distance matters” (Olson & Olson, 2000) in many
subtle ways when collaborating through technology. Even with extremely high bandwidth
communication in multiple modalities, some advantages of spatial co-location will be difficult to
replicate online, such as access to implicit contextual information, unconstrained gaze and gesture
as cues for identifying deictic referents, and the use of interpersonal space to coordinate action.
Third, it is not sufficient for CSCL to merely replicate FTF interaction. As Pfister (2005)
puts it “even if virtual reality is achieved ... genuine learning discourse is not supported. It is
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completely up to the participants ... how to structure the learning process.” Rather than leaving
efficient learning up to the learners, CSCL has an obligation to design technology that supports
effective collaborative learning. In order to do so, some commitment to an epistemology is
necessary.
Fourth, CSCL can explore the advantages of going “beyond being there” (Hollan & Stornetta,
1992): ways in which CMC is actually better than FTF. An obvious example is that CMC “turns
communication into substance” (Dillenbourg, 2005), providing additional resources for learning.
The record of contributions and shared representations that are manipulated during
communication provide a shared persistent information base that enables the community of
collaborators to reflect and act on its own state of understanding—to reinterpret, find
connections between, refine and expand information and ideas explored over time.
Research that focuses primarily on supporting collaboration through CMC but does not
necessarily directly address issues of learning might be considered peripheral to CSCL. However,
under the proposed agenda, understanding the affordances technology offers for intersubjective
meaning-making is as foundational to CSCL as understanding learning. (Although “affordances”
originated with Gibson (1977), in this paper, the term is used in Norman’s (1999) sense of
“perceived affordances,” widely adopted in the human-computer interaction literature.) Much
further work is needed to answer questions such as: What strategies do people use to manage
collaboration and meaning-making via artifact-mediation? How are the affordances of various
media (including but not limited to information technologies) appropriated to carry out these
strategies? How then can we design information technologies to provide functionally equivalent
affordances with the most natural match to the observed strategies? (Dwyer & Suthers, 2005).
Technology as Constraint and Guide
Computational technologies, as well as other information technologies such as paper based
instructional materials, are often applied to education as means to limit the options available to
learners. Although it sounds negative, this is sometimes a useful strategy, for two major reasons:
reducing socio-cognitive load and implementing a learning agenda.
Properly applied, constraints on activity can resolve a paradox of collaborative learning.
Collaboration imposes an additional task on the learners: in addition to choosing actions within
the problem domain and evaluating the consequences of those actions, they must also manage
interpersonal relations and group functioning (Whitworth, Gallupe & McQueen, 2000). Learning
may be reduced if cognitive resources are diverted from the primary task (Sweller, van
Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998). However, if learners can help each other with different parts of the
problem, collaboration can reduce task load. Furthermore, collaboration can increase learning
effectiveness through activities that are more difficult to do alone, such as argumentation,
explanation and reflection (Andriessen, Baker & Suthers, 2003; Slavin, 1995). To resolve this
paradox, instructional technology is often designed to structure part of the activity, “offloading”
work onto the technology so that learners can focus their cognitive and social resources on other
relevant aspects of the learning activity. The technology support can take different forms, such
as full automatization of the offloaded task, constraining actions to reduce the need to make
decisions while executing the task, or non-mandatory guides such as coaching agents or
representational guidance. Whatever form it takes, this support might be subsequently removed
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(the “scaffolding” “fades” in this mixed metaphor) as learners internalize the guidance it provided.
This strategy is called a reduction of sociocognitive load strategy, expanding on Sweller, et al.’s
(1998) concept of cognitive load, because the strategy addresses the capacity of the group, not
just individuals, to manage multiple task demands at once. Important research topics include
determining what to scaffold (Weinberger, Reiserer, Ertl, Fischer & Mandl, 2005), comparing the
effectiveness of different forms of scaffolding (Rummel & Spada, 2005), optimizing fading
strategies, and exploring whether the answers to these questions generalize in any predictable
ways across task domains.
Technology constraints can also be used to implement a learning agenda. Analysis of the
learning task may reveal prerequisites, or uncover difficulties that are best left for after
fundamental skills are learned. Then, guidance is applied via any of the methods previously listed
(automatization, interface constraints, coaches, representational guidance) to ensure that skills are
acquired or new challenges are taken on in an optimal order. Choices of what parts of the task to
“scaffold” and how to sequence “fading” can be effective ways to implement a learning agenda.
Similarly, constraints can be used to enforce a collaboration protocol, perhaps one based on an
epistemological commitment as to what constitutes learning through collaboration (e.g., Jermann
& Dillenbourg, 2003; Weinberger et al., 2005) For example, some researchers have identified
collections of conversational moves that they believe are necessary for an effective learning
dialogue, and implemented these moves as mandatory sentence openers in a communication
interface (e.g., Baker & Lund, 1997; Robertson, Good & Pain, 1998).
Some ways in which technology can be used to guide and support collaborative learning are
not intrinsic to the technology itself. For example, consider scripting and role-playing. We might
prompt participants to go through phases of collaboration, or provide protocols for making and
evaluating proposals. These interventions could just as well be done with paper, or even verbal
instructions. There are clear advantages to using computational technology, such as support for
distance interaction and automated prompting, but the primary variable being studied is not itself
a property of computational technology (see also Dillenbourg, 2002).
From the point of view of theories that claim to be able to prescribe activities for learners,
technology-as-constraint has great value. Indeed, domain-specific (Shulman, 1987) and even
problem-specific (Anderson, Corbett, Koedinger & Pelletier, 1995) guidance is seen as critical to
learning success. However, domain-specific guidance is more of a problem for instructional design
than one specific to the unique concerns of CSCL. Also, the use of technology as guide and
constraint risks inflexibility, and may be inappropriate for learner-driven epistemologies such as
intersubjective meaning-making and knowledge building. Under these epistemologies, we do not
want to limit the potential meanings that can be expressed or trajectories of joint action through
which a group approaches a problem. Rather, we want to uncover and exploit affordances to
make these easier.
Technology Affordances for Intersubjective Meaning-making
In order to serve the intersubjective meaning-making agenda, a selective synthesis of the two uses
of technology mediation just discussed is needed. Richer communication media are needed,
particularly with respect to supporting the indexical nature of human communication (Nunberg,
1993). Guidance for a learning agenda is needed for both discipline-specific practices and learning
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trajectories and for processes of intersubjective meaning-making, but without limiting creativity
by excessively rigid scripting of action. In order to achieve advancements in these forms of
support, we need to better understand “the ways in which these practices [meaning-making in
the context of joint activity] are mediated through designed artifacts” (the second half of
Koschmann’s definition of CSCL). The third major claim of this paper follows:
The technology side of the CSCL agenda should focus on the design and study of
fundamentally social technologies that are informed by the affordances and limitations of those
technologies for mediating intersubjective meaning-making.
CSCL systems should be fundamentally social because interactional and especially
intersubjective epistemologies of learning require this. To be fundamentally social means that the
technology should be designed specifically to mediate and encourage acts of intersubjective
meaning-making. To be informed by the affordances and limitations of a technology means that
the design attempts to leverage the unique opportunities provided by the technology rather than
replicating support for learning that could be done through other means, or (worse) trying to
force the technology to be something for which it is not well suited.
The research agenda surrounding technology affordances for intersubjectivity is rich. We first
need to understand what collaborative strategies people use when communicating via information
artifacts of all types. Human communication and the use of representational resources in its
service are flexible: we cannot specify meanings or communicative functions for those resources
in advance. Instead, CSCL research should identify how collaborators appropriate perceived
affordances of media (Norman, 1999), and explore how notational properties (e.g., Blackwell &
Green, 2003) of media influence the course of collaboration. Interactional strategies that recur
across a variety of media are likely to be essential (Dwyer & Suthers, 2005). People will try to
find a way to apply them regardless of how viscous the medium is with respect to those
strategies. Our job as designers is to find more natural mappings, offering collections of
affordances that support participants’ strategies while providing flexible forms of guidance (see
also Kirschner, Martens & Strijbos, 2004). The remainder of this section discusses some unique
opportunities computational technology provides for intersubjective meaning-making, suggesting
specific lines of investigation for the proposed research agenda.  
(Im)mutable Mobiles. As a notational medium, the computational medium is reconfigurable
and replicable. It is easy to manipulate digital objects and to replicate actions and objects
elsewhere: one can bridge time and space. The mobility of digital inscriptions—both mutable and
immutable—provides opportunities for recruitment of partners in the sense-making process
(Latour, 1990) and supports continued engagement in that process. How can we exploit this
property of technology for its potential to make new social alignments and their interactions
possible?
Negotiation Potentials. Any medium offers certain potentials for action. To the extent that
inscriptions within the medium are socially shared (e.g., representations of problem solutions in a
synchronized workspace), participants may feel an obligation to obtain agreement on
modifications to those inscriptions. The potentials for action offered by the medium can
therefore guide interactions towards ideas associated with the afforded actions (Suthers &
Hundhausen, 2003). An analysis can begin by asking: what constructive actions does the medium
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enable? Which possibilities for action are most salient (i.e., are perceived affordances)? What
decisions must be made to choose and carry out one of these actions? If participants negotiate
these decisions, will their interactions be productive for learning according to the epistemology
guiding the design? Design can apply this analysis in reverse: if we would like users of our
technology medium to focus on particular aspects of a problem, how can the medium be designed
to prompt for actions that require negotiation of these aspects?
Referential Resource. Jointly constructed representations become imbued with meanings for
the participants by virtue of having been produced through a process of negotiation. These
representational constituents then enable reference to prior interpretations with deictic reference
(through gesture or language), or by direct manipulation (Suthers, Girardeau, & Hundhausen,
2003). In this manner, collaboratively constructed external representations facilitate subsequent
negotiations; increasing the conceptual complexity that can be handled in group interactions and
facilitating elaboration on previous conceptions. The expressive and indexical affordances of a
medium will affect its value as a referential resource. Therefore we might consider how to make
salient that which we would like our technology users to elaborate on and relate to new
information or ideas.  What interpretations (e.g., ideas or elements of the argumentation or
problem solution) do participants tend to assign to representational proxies? How can the
indexicality necessary for subsequent interpretive acts be accomplished in our technology-
mediated settings?
Similarly, disciplinary representations such as models, simulations and visualizations also
offer negotiation potentials and serve as resources for conversation. Rather than being vehicles for
communicating expert knowledge, such representations become objects about which learners
engage in sense-making conversations (Roschelle, 1994) and can be designed to lead to productive
conversation.
Integration. Inscriptions in the computational medium can be persistent. A record of activity
and its products can be kept, replayed, and modified. This property can be selectively exploited
to leverage prior activity as a learning resource, enabling compositions of interpretations that
transcend distribution across time and individuals. We should explore how a persistent record of
interaction and collaboration can serve as a resource for intersubjective meaning-making through
reflection on prior activity. How can representational artifacts be designed to foster appropriate
awareness of prior conceptions and the means to reference these in subsequent interactions so
that they may be integrated with new information and ideas?
Trajectories of Participation. What are the social affordances of technologies for patterns of
participation over larger spans of time and collections of actors? In what ways and at what scales
can multiple transformations of representations distributed across individuals and time be
collectively understood as a joint meaning-making process? Can we encourage productive
entanglement of multiple individual trajectories of participation by selectively making their
reifications salient and hence available for subsequent interpretation by others?
Adaptiveness. A computational medium can analyze workspace state and interaction
sequences, and reconfigure itself or generate prompts according to features of either. We should
explore the potential of conditional dynamism as an influence on the course of intersubjective
processes. We need not anthropomorphize the medium to take advantage of its ability to
prompt, analyze and selectively respond.
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Reflector of Subjectivity. Computational media can be designed to foster group awareness (e.g.,
Kreijns & Kirschner, 2004). The mere awareness that others are present and will evaluate one’s
actions may influence one’s choice of actions (Erickson & Kellog, 2000). Information about the
attentional status of group members and their attitudes towards previously proposed ideas may
influence the actions of individuals in the group. Visualizations of conflict or agreement between
members may lead to further argumentation or reaching of consensus (Jermann & Dillenbourg,
2003). Technology can enhance intersubjective meaning-making by projecting representations of
self into a social representation (Kaput & Hegedus, 2002) or embedding the physical self in a
social simulation (Colella,  2002). In what specific ways can we design technology to mediate
intersubjectivity by reflecting activity, subjectivity, and identity?
All of these questions of how the properties of technology can not only enable but also be
appropriated for intersubjective learning are concerned with social technology affordances. The
study of technology affordances should be undertaken with constant reference to the activity to
be supported -- intersubjective meaning-making and its consequences for learning.  
Methodological Considerations
What methodological approach is most suited for the proposed study of technology mediation of
intersubjective meaning-making? This section first considers the major methodological traditions
of CSCL and the granularities at which they may be applied, and then offers a framework for
multivocal analysis that is motivated by the definition of intersubjective meaning-making
previously advanced.  
Methodological Diversity and Synthesis
CSCL can presently be characterized as consisting of three methodological traditions: iterative
design, experimental, and descriptive.
The iterative design tradition is exemplified by Barab & Squire (2004), Fischer & Ostwald
(2005), Guzdial et al. (1997), and Lingnau, et al. (2003). Design-oriented researchers
continuously improve artifacts intended to mediate learning and collaboration, driven by the
dialectic between theory and informal observations and engaging stakeholders in the process.
Their research might best be understood as “quisitive” (Goldman, Crosby, Swan & Shea, 2004)
rather than qualitative versus quantitative. Exploring design is a valuable component of the overall
CSCL portfolio of research strategies. We are trying to uncover the potential affordances of
information technologies, so need to explore the “space” of possible designs, pushing into new
areas and identifying promising features. However, iterative design alone lacks methods for
predicting the implications of its design choices. We look to another tradition for the
establishment of dependencies between interventions and outcomes.
Many empirical studies follow the dominant experimental paradigm that compares an
intervention to a control condition in terms of one or more variables (e.g., Baker & Lund, 1997;
Rummel & Spada, 2005; Suthers & Hundhausen, 2003; Van Der Pol et al., 2003; Weinberger et
al., 2005). Data analysis in most of these studies is undertaken by “coding and counting:”
interactions are categorized and learning outcomes measured, and group means are compared
through statistical methods in order to draw generalizable conclusions about the effects of the
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manipulated variables on aggregate (average) group behavior. Typical studies do not directly
analyze the accomplishment of intersubjective meaning-making. Such an analysis must examine
the structure of specific cases of interaction rather than categorize and aggregate single
contributions. Therefore, experimental studies have been criticized for missing the point, although
this limitation is not intrinsic to the experimental approach, but rather to the methods of analysis
used. Another critique concerns the weak external (ecological) validity of studies based on
contrived situations.
Descriptive research addresses these concerns through methods that are more suited for
understanding authentic practice through case studies. These include Conversation Analysis
(Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974), Interaction Analysis (Jordan & Henderson, 1995),
Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), and Narrative Analysis (Hermann, 2003).
Descriptive methods are exemplified in CSCL by Baker (2003), Roschelle (1994), Koschmann et
al. (2003), Koschmann, et al. (2005), and Yukawa (2005). Typically, video or transcripts of
activity in “natural” settings are studied to uncover the methods by which participants
accomplish learning. The approach is data-driven, seeking to discover patterns in the data rather
than imposing theoretical categories. Some descriptive methods such as conversation analysis are
microanalytic, examining brief episodes in great detail, but others such as narrative analysis
address phenomena at a larger scale. Descriptive methodologies are well suited to existentially
quantified claims (e.g., that a community sometimes engages in a given practice). Yet, as scientists
and designers we would like to make predictive generalizations about the effects of design
choices. Descriptive methodologies are less suited for claiming that an intervention has an effect,
the province of experimental methodology.
If we focus on finding examples of how members accomplish learning, we may miss abundant
examples of how they also fail to do so. Yet in order to find that something is not there, we need
to have an idea of what we are looking for. A purely data-driven approach that derives but never
applies theory does not complete the job. An iterative comparative approach can be applied to
address this need. Common patterns found in successful learning episodes subsequently become
the theoretical categories we look for elsewhere, and perhaps do not find in instances of
unsuccessful collaboration.  Having identified where the successful methods were not applied, we
can then examine the situation to determine what contingency was missing or responsible. Care
should be taken, however, to make sure that in finding case examples where the interactional
accomplishment of learning as we define it is absent we do not fail to notice where something else
of value to the participants is being accomplished! For example, establishment and maintenance
of individual and group identity are also worthwhile accomplishments as far as the participants
are concerned (Whitworth et al., 2000), and indeed are a form of learning, whether or not they are
aligned with researchers’ or institutionally sanctioned learning objectives.
The foregoing discussion of complementary traits suggests that we explore mixed and hybrid
research methodologies, drawing upon the strengths of each (Creswell, 2003; Häkkinen, Järvelä,
& Mäkitalo, 2003; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Multiple forms of mixed method research
are possible. Creswell (2003) discusses various sequential and concurrent strategies. In a
sequential strategy, one method is used to locate portions of the data to be analyzed by other
methods. For example, traditional quantitative analyses, including coding and counting of
interaction categories and measures of learning outcomes, might be used to obtain quick indicators
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of where more detailed descriptive analyses are merited, thereby focusing the time-consuming
work. Conversely, descriptive analyses can be used to identify the affordances of designed
artifacts that seem to be correlated with effective learning episodes, thereby isolating variables
that can be explored systematically in experimental designs. Concurrent triangulation strategies
apply multiple methods independently of each other in order to obtain a consistency check (if
they are addressing the same aspect of the phenomenon) or to obtain a richer understanding of
the phenomenon from different perspectives (if they address different aspects). For example,
Koschmann, Zemel & Stahl’s (2004) suggest that ethnomethodology be applied to understand
practice in the context of design-based research. Concurrent nested strategies combine multiple
methods into a single analysis. For example, experimental designs can compare interventions in
terms of descriptive analyses of how the features of information technology influence and are
appropriated for members' methods of joint meaning-making. This fusion raises the level of
experimental “coding and counting” to patterns of meaning-making that are less subject to the
critique of missing the point, while providing the descriptive methodology with systematically
varied contexts that sanction correspondingly systematic generalizations. Such analyses are time
intensive: researchers will need instrumentation of learning environments and automated
visualization and querying of interaction logs as research aids. In each of these examples, the
synthesis need not relegate either family of methodologies to subservient roles. For example, a
conversation between the theoretical assumptions of ethnomethodology and those of design can
lead to a “technomethodology” that changes the very objectives of design (Button & Dourish,
1996).
Unit of Study
Stahl (in press) argues that small groups are the most fruitful unit of study, for two reasons.
Most simply, small groups are where members’ methods for intersubjective meaning-making can
be observed. Groups of several members allow the full range of social interactions to play out,
but are not so large for participants and researchers alike lose track of what is going on. More
interestingly, small groups lie at the boundary of and mediate between individuals and a
community. The knowledge building that takes place within small groups becomes “internalized
by their members as individual learning and externalized in their communities as certifiable
knowledge” (Stahl, in press). However, small groups should not be the only social granularity
studied. For example, understanding the emergence of social and knowledge capital in a
community of practice may require tracing out the evolution of relationships and the formation
and spread of ideas in networks of individuals larger than the small group (Resnick, 2002;
Wenger, McDermott & Snyder, 2002). Analysis of large-scale changes in communities and
organizations may lead to understanding of emergent social learning phenomena (Engeström,
2001) as well as elucidate the role of embedded groups in driving these changes. At the other
extreme, Shaffer & Clinton (2005) argue that even the interaction between an individual and
technology can be understood as collaborative.
To Appear in International Journal of Computer Supported Collaborative Learning 1(2), 2006
 Draft January 19, 2006 for typesetting
17
Eclectic Analysis of Uptake
In the proposal under consideration, multiple theoretical and methodological traditions are
brought to bear on the problem of understanding technology-mediated intersubjective meaning-
making. This final section proposes a framework for eclectic analysis.
Intersubjective meaning-making requires interactions between participants (interpretations of
reifications of actions of another participant). Any analysis of intersubjective meaning-making,
whether microanalytic or concerned with the dynamics of the community or culture evolving
through time, must begin by identifying uptake acts in which one participant takes up another’s
contribution and does something further with it. Contributions may include attentional
orientation, information, or expressions of attitude, reified as media affordances allow. Examples
of uptake include “A has expressed proposition P(!), B expresses Q(!), or Q(P(!)),” “A says P
and B expresses (dis)agreement,” “A makes object O available, and B attends to O,” “A has
created object O1; B has changed it to O2,” “A has created O1 and B has created O2; now A
combines O1 and O2 in such a manner,” etc.
In order to begin with a defensible starting point for analysis, we consider only uptake
relations that are evidenced by the observable dependence of an act on others or their products.
Inferences that require further theoretical commitments are left for subsequent analysis. In order
to support analysis of both personal and group processes and how the two are intertwined, both
intra- and inter-subjective uptake relations are included. The resulting collection of uptake
relations may be conceived of as a directed acyclic graph (embedded in a temporally continuous
process) consisting of arcs between points at which we have evidence (grounded in use of media
affordances) of perceptions and/or expressions of attention, attitudes and conceptions.
Once we have identified a portion of this uptake structure, we need to recognize what the
participants have accomplished through sequences or compositions of uptakes, and we need to
identify the potential influence or utilization of technology affordances in this accomplishment.
What do we look for in order to identify the acts of interpretation and meaning-making
accomplished through the uptake? Different analytic approaches offer different answers to this
question (Suthers, 2005). The uptake graph becomes a boundary object (Star, 2000) towards
which theoretical and methodological discourse between these analytic approaches may be
directed. We can layer interpretations on this graph, working from the physical actions and their
interdependencies to inferences concerning participants’ personal and intersubjective meaning-
making processes. Multiple interpretations can be juxtaposed and compared. There will always
be multiple interpretations because an action can be understood simultaneously as an act on the
objective world, an attempt to conform to behavioral norms, and a way of constructing one’s
identity in the social world (Bronckart, 1995); and participation in a community can be
understood on three “planes” (Rogoff, 1995). Also, collaborative knowledge construction
involves multiple processes (see figure 9-1 of Stahl, in press). An eclectic approach that
“triangulates” from multiple theoretical perspectives is necessary due to the complexity of the
problem we are tackling. We can draw upon various theories for insights on what counts as
interpretive acts and what those acts mean for the learning of individuals and groups.
This framework was applied in an analysis of participant’s manipulations of a shared
workspace during synchronous online collaboration in order to determine whether and how such
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actions can be understood as accomplishing collaborative knowledge construction (Suthers,
2005). The analysis explored the potential contribution of different theoretical stances, including
contribution theory, socio-cognitive theories, distributed cognition, and activity theory. There are
other theories that can be applied to the process of generating researchers’ interpretations of
uptake relations as evidence of participants’ composition of interpretations of their dynamically
evolving context. The challenge is to take the step from affordances defined in terms of features
of representations to the social level and make predictions of the opportunities the technology
provides for discovering affinities with others, orienting attention, expressing viewpoints,
exposing conflict and consensus, and supporting debate and negotiation. We have at our disposal
a powerful repertoire of theories of learning and social interaction, and have not yet fully
explored the analytic power of this repertoire. Incompatibilities between the fundamental world-
views of proponents of these theories do exist, but this does not prevent those of us who are
open to a multivocal understanding of the phenomena we study from appropriating the insights
of each theory and applying them towards achieving this understanding.
Conclusions
CSCL is a field that is establishing basic yet sometimes peripheral findings as it seeks its center.
Work currently being undertaken in the field is undertaken through diverse methods,
encompasses several epistemologies of collaborative learning, and leverages information
technology as communication medium and as a constraining and guiding medium. However, there
is an emerging awareness that we need to grapple with the central and most unique problem of
CSCL: processes of intersubjective meaning-making and how technological affordances mediate or
support such processes.
Research methodology in CSCL is largely trichotomized between experimental, descriptive
and iterative design approaches. Although sometimes combined within a single research project,
the methodologies are even then typically kept separate in companion studies or separate
analyses of a single study. This situation can be productive for a little longer, as the
experimentalists continue to identify variables that affect general parameters of collaborative
behavior, while the ethnomethodologists identify patterns of joint activity that are essential to
the meaning-making and learning we all seek to support. However, very soon CSCL needs
experimentalists to study dependent variables that directly reflect the phenomenon of interest,
the ethnomethodologists to look for predictive regularities in technology-mediated meaning-
making that can inform design, and the designers to generate and assess promising new
technology affordances in terms of the meaning-making activities they enable. Mutual assistance
is possible through sequentially and concurrently hybrid methodologies, and through computer
support for our own meaning-making activities as researchers. A common focus on
intersubjective meaning-making will serve to increase the dialogue between subcommunities of
CSCL. A framework for analysis was offered in which inter- and intra-subjective “uptakes”
grounded in observed uses of media affordances are identified, forming a graph that serves as a
common starting point for multiple analyses exploring participants’ personal and intersubjective
meaning-making processes, and as a boundary object for discourse between the theoretical
traditions that inform these analyses. This paper is offered in hopes of accelerating an impending
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shift in our field—towards the study of practices of intersubjective meaning-making and how
these practices are mediated by technology affordances.
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